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THE REGULATION OF 
ELECTROCONVULSIVE THERAPY IN 
CALIFORNIA: THE IMPACT OF RECENT 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right to personal autonomy is relatively new in the pan-
oply of protected constitutional interests. 1 The nature and scope 
of this right, and whether it should be ranked along with other 
rights traditionally regarded as fundamental, are points of vigor-
ous contention in legal and political circles.2 It has become gen-
erally accepted by courts that patients treated for physical ill-
nesses have a right derived from notions of privacy to determine 
their own medical destiny.s There has been greater reluctance to 
extend such rights of patient self-determination to persons con-
fined for mental illnesses. Given that persons without mental 
disorders have a right to refuse most medical treatment, the 
question becomes whether such rights are forfeited due to afflic-
tion with such conditions. 
Legislation restricting the imposition of treatment upon un-
willing mental patients has commonly brought criticism from 
some members of the medical community;' These health care 
1. Rights related to personal autonomy are generally thought to be subsumed in the 
right of privacy first articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The 
United States Supreme Court has described the nature of the right of privacy in the 
following manner: "The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in 
fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in 
making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 
(1977). Though the California laws regulating Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT) have 
some bearing on the disclosure aspects of privacy, their relation to the decisionmaking 
facet of privacy is of more concern. 
2. The recent Supreme Court confirmation hearings of Judge Bork and Justice Ken-
nedy largely focused on their respective views of privacy rights. 
3. This right, known as "informed consent", was described fully in Canterbury v. 
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Californians were given the same right to in-
formed consent in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d I, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). 
4. Kramer, Use of Ecr in California, 1977-1983, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1190 (1985). 
469 
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providers believe since persons with mental disabilities have 
been committed for the purpose of treatment, II society has made 
a judgment that the patient has no right to refuse treatment 
proposed by a professional.6 It is the clash of this viewpoint with 
those held by patient advocates-that anyone not determined by 
a court to be incompetent to make medical decisions retains a 
right to refuse treatment-which shapes the discussion in this 
article. 
Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT) is growing in popularity 
amongst the clinical psychiatric community in California despite 
legislation regulating its use.7 Further increase in the clinical use 
of ECT would impact women and the elderly most severely of all 
groups.s Physicians have been successful in overturning munici-
pal ordinances designed to ban the use of ECT within city lim-
its,9 and have now set their sights on the statutory and adminis-
According to Kramer, "Legislation generated by this controversy [over ECT) has the 
potential to deprive patients of treatment that may be lifesaving." Id. at 1190. 
5. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5150, 5250 (West 1984). Section 5150 authorizes 
"treatment and evaluation" for seventy two hours for persons judged to be a danger to 
themselves or others, or to be gravely disabled. Section 5250 authorizes an additional 
fourteen days of "involuntary intensive treatment" under certain conditions. See also 
Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981) (due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment requires hearing by neutral decision maker for certification under section 
5250). 
6. The attorney representing the defendant hospital in a recent class action brought 
by involuntarily committed patients asserting their right to refuse antipsychotic drugs 
stated: "[I)t's a self-evident proposition that when the Legislature authorized that people 
be involuntarily committed, it authorized that they be treated. There's no purpose in 
setting up involuntary commitments and letting those same people decide the treat-
ment." Patient Can Reject Mind Drugs, State Court Rules, The Recorder, Dec. 17, 1987, 
at 8, col. 3, discussing Reise v. St. Mary's Hospital and Medical Center, 196 Cal. App. 3d 
1388, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1987), cert. granted (the administration of antipsychotic drugs 
held to be within the strictures of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act). 
7. From 1977 to 1981, the average number of patients receiving ECT in California 
was 2,599 per year. From 1982 to 1985, that average climbed to 2,867 patients per 
year-an increase of 368 patients per year or just over 9%. CAL. DEP'T. OF MENTAL 
HEALTH, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE ON ELECTROCON-
VULSIVE THERAPY AND PSYCHOSURGERY. 
8. In 1985, women received 70.5% of the ECTs administered in California. Persons 
aged sixty five and over comprised 48.5% of the population receiving ECT in 1985. Id. 
9. Northern CaJ. Psychiatric Soc'y v. City of Berkeley, 178 Cal. App. 3d 90, 223 Cal. 
Rptr. 608 (1986). Berkeley City Ordinance 5504 prohibited, without exception, the ad-
ministration of ECT to any person within the city. The California Court of Appeals ruled 
that the state legislature intended to retain ECT as a treatment option despite heavy 
regulation, and that municipal regulatory authority was preempted by the state 
legislation. 
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trative provisions governing ECT in California.10 
The various constitutional theories supportive of, and hos-
tile to, state regulation of psychiatric treatment to the volunta-
rily and involuntarily confined comprise the bulk of the discus-
sion in this article. Central to the arguments of both those who 
attack and those who defend such legislation are notions of pri-
vacy. Those seeking to set aside ECT regulation stress the pri-
vacy inherent in the patient-physician relationship. In support 
of its enactments, the state emphasizes protecting the patient's 
medical welfare, as well as the patient's rights to refuse treat-
ment and to control what happens to their own bodies and 
minds. The current debate concerning privacy and whether it is 
a fundamental constitutional right might become less meaning-
ful in this context, since the privacy sword is wielded by both 
sides. Constitutional adjudication of state regulation of intrusive 
psychiatric therapies would become more of a policy choice than 
a doctrinal analysis. 
This article will begin with a brief description of ECT. 
Those less interested in the medical aspects may ignore this sec-
tion. Such information could be important to an attorney, how-
ever, especially in an ECT malpractice action or other direct 
dealings with an ECT patient. The existing California regulatory 
scheme of ECT will be detailed, followed by constitutional argu-
ments regarding the review committee, risk disclosure, and sub-
stitute consent provisions of these laws. It is the purpose of this 
discusion not only to provide the reader with an introduction to 
the California ECT laws, but to argue that such laws are a valid 
and important means of protecting the mentally ill. 
II. ECT: HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND EFFECTS 
Electroconvulsive therapy is a psychiatric treatment which 
10. Doe v. O'Connor, No. C 646194 (Superior Ct. of Cal., Cty. of Los Angeles). The 
plaintiffs in this case, including a group named as "The International Psychiatric Associ-
ation for the Advancement of Electrotherapy", seek to have the California statutes and 
rules regulating ECT declared unconstitutional. In their complaint, they claim that the 
legislative scheme "unduly limits and effectively prohibits patients from receiving, and 
licensed physicians from administering, accepted and appropriate forms of treatment for 
severe and often incapacitating mental illnesses or conditions." Plaintiffs rely upon the 
first, fourth, fifth, eighth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Con-
stitution and article I, sections one, two, and seven of the California Constitution. 
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creates a seizure in the brain by the induction of B:l electric cur-
rent. ll ECT was developed roughly half a century C!!!o when Ugo 
Cerletti, a professor of neuropsychiatry, and Lucio Beni, a 
neuropsychiatrist, drew upon their experimentation with the in-
duction of electrical convulsions in animals. In 1938, Cerletti and 
Beni performed the first electroconvulsive treatment on humans, 
against the protests of their patient.12 Early ECT was adminis-
tered without the benefits of anesthesia, muscle relaxants, or ox-
ygenation.13 Bone fractures, apnea, fright, and death were com-
mon, in some cases even probable, side effects of ECT.14 The 
treatment was prescribed for a number of disorders for which it 
is now thought inappropriate, in particular schizophrenia. II! Use 
of ECT as a method of keeping patients managable and quies-
cent rather than as a treatment for their conditions is well 
known. IS With the development of antipsychotic medications in 
the 1950's and 1960's, use of ECT subsided considerably.17 
The most remarkable aspect of ECT is that no one, not 
even those physicians who prescribe it, possess a clear under-
standing of its physiological operation. A recent conference of 
ECT practitioners noted the "[i]dentification of biological mech-
anisms underlying the therapeutic effects of ECT" as "[a]mong 
the most important immediate research tasks."18 Some authori-
ties believe that ECT reduces psychotic behavior by disabling all 
of the mind's higher functions. 19 Others who defend ECT rely 
11. Electroconvulsive Therapy-Consensus Conference, 254 J.A.M.A. 2103, 2103 
(1985). 
12. Accounts have it that as Cerletti was placing the electrodes on the subject's head 
for a second ECT administration, the patient cried out, "Not another one. It's deadly!" 
Since the patient had previously been uncommunicative, Cerletti took this outburst as a 
sign of the positive therapeutic value of ECT. ELECTROCONVULSIVE THERAPY: AN Ap-
PRAISAL 8-9 (R. Palmer ed. 1981). 
13. [d. at 15. 
14. [d. at 15. One early study noted that over 35% of 212 ECT patients developed 
bone fractures, especially compression fractures of the back vertebrae. 
15. See Electroconvulsive Therapy-Consensus Conference, supra note 11, at 2103. 
16. [d.; See also P. BREGGIN, ELECTROSHOCK: ITS BRAIN DISABLING EFFECTS 135 
(1979). 
17. See Electroconvulsive Therapy-Consensus Conference, supra note 11, at 2103. 
The report noted that an estimated 33,384 patients admitted to psychiatric hospitals 
nationwide received ECT in 1980-amounting to roughly 2.4 % of psychiatric admissions. 
18. [d. at 2107. 
19. P. BREGGlN, supra note 16. Dr. Breggin states: 
ECT produces its primary effect through the dysfunction and 
damage it inflicts on the normal brain and hence on the 
mind .... An organically disabled person is a more helpless 
4
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heavily on the vast number of clinical research studies which 
demonstrate various degrees of improvement for patients 
treated with electroshock. Still, no satisfactory theory of why 
ECT produces any beneficial effect on patients has been for-
warded; predominantly all of the evidence is empirical in nature. 
ECT is used primarily in the treatment of affective disor-
ders20 such as: melancholic depression,21 delusional depression,22 
acute mania,23 and, to a lesser extent, schizophrenia.24 ECT is 
considered most effective in the treatment of depressions.2& Sui-
cidal patients may be indicated for ECT, since its effects have a 
more rapid onset than antidepressant drugs.26 ECT may also be 
effective for patients who have reached toxicity levels of, or are 
resistant to, their medication.27 Geriatric depressives make up a 
[d. at 135. 
person. As such he is often less troublesome to others. He usu-
ally but not always complains less about himself and his life 
situation; in many instances, the acute organic brain syndrome 
may include irrational euphoria that masquerades as "im-
provement". Ultimately the brain-disabled person is more 
managable, docile, or tractable. 
20. Affective disorders are those psychoses typified by a severe disorder in mood and 
secondary disturbances in thinking and behavior which are in consonance with the affect. 
L. HINSIE & R. CAMPBELL. PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 20 (4th ed. 1973). 
21. Melancholic depression is a morbid mental state, characterized by dejection, loss 
of interest in the outside world, loss of capacity to love, inhibitions of activity, and loss of 
self-esteem. [d. at 458. 
22. Delusionally depressed patients are severely depressed with gross misinterpreta-
tions of reality, including delusions and hallucinations. [d. at 203. 
23. Mania is a mental disorder characterized by violent, unrestrained behavior. [d. 
at 445. 
24. Schizophrenia is characterized by disturbances in associations and mood, ambiv-
alence of affect, intellect, and will, autism, attention defects, disturbances of the will, 
schizophrenic dementia, and disturbances of activity and behavior. [d. at 679. 
25. The ECT conference cosponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health 
(NIMH) and the National Institute of Health (NIH) concluded that in the treatment of 
delusional depression, ECT was superior to either antidepressive or neuroleptic drugs 
when used alone, and at least as effective as a combination of the two. For the treatment 
of melancholic depression, ECT was rated roughly equal with tricylic antidepressants 
and monamine oxidase (MAO) inhibators. ECT was not recommended for patients with 
milder depressions, such as neurotic depression. The conference compared studies of 
ECT and lithium in the treatment of acute mania, and found the two stand in parity. In 
the treatment of schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorders, ECT compared unfavorably 
to the use of neuroleptics. Electroconvulsive Therapy-Consensus Conference, supra 
note 11, at 2104. 
26. Kramer, Electroconvulsive Therapy Use In Geriatric Depression, 175 J. NERV. 
MENT. DISEASE 233, 233 (1987). 
27. M. FINK. CONVULSIVE THERAPY:THEORY AND PRACTICE 53-54 (1979). 
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large part of this category of patients.28 Use of ECT also avoids 
the development of tardive dyskensia,29 a common and perma-
nent side effect of psychopharmaceuticals. On the other hand, 
ECT is known to cause a variety of adverse side effects. The-
fright, bone fractures, and apnea which were once commonly as-
sociated with ECT can be virtually eliminated by the use of a 
general anesthetic, muscle relaxants, and proper oxygenation.30 
Broken teeth can usually be avoided by the use of a rubber bite 
block.31 Other potential side effects include epilepsy, headaches, 
skin burns, nerve palsy, high blood pressure, and death.32 Most 
ECT practitioners do not believe the treatment to cause perma-
nent brain damage, though some physicians strongly dispute the 
claim.33 
The major side effect of ECT is memory 10ss.34 Memory of 
events both before ECT treatments (retrograde amnesia) and af-
terwards (anterograde amnesia) is affected, sometimes perma-
nently.3Ci ECT has a cumulative effect upon memory; that is, the 
greater the number and intensity of applications, the greater the 
likelihood and severity of amnesia.36 Most of the innovative 
techniques in ECT concentrate on the problem of reducing 
memory 10ss.37 
28. Kramer, supra note 26, at 233. Such indicators may explain why 37% (or 48.5% 
in 1985. See supra note 8.) of all ECTs administered in California were to patients 65 
years or older, though they constitute only 10% of the general population. 
29. For a description of the effects of tardive dyskensia, see Reise v. St. Mary's Hos-
pital and Medical Center, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1396-97, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241, 245-46 
(1987), cert. granted. 
30. Martin, Electroconvulsive Therapy: Contemporary Standards of Practice, 31 
CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 759, 759 (1986). 
31. [d. at 764. 
32. Electroconvulsive Therapy-Consensus Conference, supra note 11, at 2105. 
33. See P. BREGGlN, supra note 19. 
34. CAL. DEP'T. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 7. In 1985, memory loss accounted 
for 97.4 % of all recorded complications from ECT in California. Complications were 
reported, as required by CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.15(c)(4) (West 1984) for 833 of 
the 2,856 patients given ECT that year: a rate of just over 29%. Eight hundred and 
eleven of the 833 complications were attributed to memory loss, or 28.4% of all patients. 
It may be important to note that only incidents of cardiac arrest without death, frac-
tures, memory loss, apnea, and death are required by the above statute to be reported. 
Patients who suffered from other side effects, such as epilepsy, tooth damage, skin burns, 
nerve palsy, or severe headaches, were not accounted for. 
35. Electroconvulsive Therapy-Consensus Conference, supra note 11, at 2105. 
36. Valentine, Keddie, & Dunne, A Comparison of Techniques in Electroconvulsive 
Therapy, 114 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 989, 989 (1968). 
37. Innovative techniques in ECT use include unilateral ECT, brief pulse ECT, low 
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Of the several intrusive psychiatric therapies developed in 
the 1930's (including psychosurgery and insulin coma therapy), 
only ECT remains widely used today. In California alone, at 
least 131,000 ECTs were performed in the years 1977 to 1985.38 
Other statistics indicate that ECT is on the rise after being dealt 
an initial setback by the enactment of the Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act (LPS Act).39 ECT advocates are becoming more 
vociferious in their demands for the relaxation of state regula-
tion.40 They argue that the goal of commitment is the improve-
ment of the patient's condition, and that ECT is an effective 
way to produce results. The legislation regulating ECT, they say, 
deprives the committed person of the opportunity, and perhaps 
the right, to treatment which may result in discharge from the 
care facility. 
III. PRESENT CALIFORNIA ECT LAW 
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act41 sets forth the statutory 
restrictions placed upon the use of ECT as a treatment for 
mental illness in a non-criminal setting.'2 Complementary provi-
sions can be found in the California Administrative Code.43 The 
purpose of the LPS Act is to recognize the civil rights of the 
mentally ill and ensure the protection of these rights." This sec-
energy ECT, and multiple-monitored ECT. See Fontaine & Young, Unilateral ECT: Ad-
vantages and Efficacy in the Treatment of Depression, 30 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 142 
(1985); Squire, ECT and Memory: Brief Pulse v. Sine Wave, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 596 
(1986); Electroconvulsive Therapy-Consensus Conference, supra note 11; Maletsky, 
Conventional and Multiple Monitored ECT: A Comparison in Major Depressive Disor-
ders, 174 J. NERV. MENT. DISEASE 257 (1986). 
38. CAL. DEP'T. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 7. I say "at least" 131,000 treatments 
because not every ECT administration may have been reported. In its report, the De-
partment of Mental Health stated its suspicion that ECT use was underreported. It 
hinted that not all treatments in a series were being reported. A true appraisal of the 
number of ECT's performed between 1977 and 1985 might be something closer to 
150,000 or even 200,000. Compare these numbers with the fact that the Department of 
Mental Health has received no reports of psychosurgery in the years 1977 to 1985. 
39. See supra note 7. 
40. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
41. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5579 (West 1984 & Supp. 1988). 
42. The use of organic psychiatric treatments in prisons is dealt with at CAL. PENAL 
CODE §§ 2670-2680 (West 1982). 
43. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 9 §§ 835-849 (1985). 
44. See California State Psychological Ass'n v. County of San Diego, 148 Cal. App. 
3d 849, 198 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1983). The appellate court said, "LPS protects the rights of 
civilly committed mentally disordered persons, developmentally disabled persons, and 
persons impaired by chronic alcoholism. The act provides for prompt evaluation and 
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tion will describe the existing ECT laws in California. Attorneys 
in state can use this summation as a practice guide, while mental 
health advocates out of state may look upon it as an model of 
patient-protective regulation. In addition, the review committee, 
risk disclosure, and substitute consent provisions will be intro-
duced. Later in this article, these facets of California's ECT laws 
shall be subjected to constitutional analysis.411 
The fundamental proscription of the California ECT laws 
consists of a ban on the treatment unless the patient gives his or 
her informed consent.48 The LPS Act defines convulsive treat-
ment as any treatment of a mental disorder which depends on 
the induction of a convulsion by any means." This definition is 
broader than the clinical usage of the term ECT. The induction 
of a cerebral seizure, rather than general bodily convulsions, is 
the purpose of ECT.48 In general, both the voluntarily and invol-
untarily confined have a right to refuse ECT.4& This right can be 
denied only by a judicial determination of incompetency and the 
subsequent procurement of consent from a responsible relative, 
guardian, or conservator of the patient. llo The right to refuse is 
the flip side of the right to informed consent, which is recog-
nized in California. 111 
The right to informed consent has its origins in the common 
lawll2 as well as the federai lis and state constitutions.1I4 In Califor-
treatment while protecting public safety and safeguarding individual rights through judi-
cial review." Id. at 854-55, 198 Cai.Rptr. at 4. 
45. See infra Section IV, CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS REGARDING CAL-
IFORNIA'S REGULATORY SCHEME FOR ECT. 
46. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325(f) (West 1984). 
47.Id. 
48. Martin, supra note 30. "ECT is a medical procedure consisting of the electrical 
induction of a series of generalized or grand mal convulsions, under general anesthetic, 
for the treatment of certain mental disorders." Id. at 759-60. 
49. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325(e) (West 1984). The LPS Act treats minors 
differently in some respects. ECT is absolutely prohibited for those under twelve years of 
age. Persons between twelve and sixteen may be given ECT when there is an emergency, 
adequate review of the decision to treat with ECT is made, and the treatment is consid-
ered lifesaving. Anyone over the age of sixteen has the same rights as an adult. See CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.8 (West 1984). The difficult problem of the constitutional 
rights of minors is beyond the scope of this article. 
50. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5326; 5326.7(e)-(h) (West 1984). 
51. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d I, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). 
52. Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 1.29, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). 
Judge Cardozo wrote, "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body .... "; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 
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nia, a physician has the duty to divulge information which would 
be material to a reasonable patient's intelligent choice of treat-
ment.1I11 Failure to live up to this duty may expose the physician 
to malpractice liability. A money judgment on the theory of in-
tentional or negligent failure to obtain informed consent would 
be an inadequate remedy, however, in the case of an already per-
formed ECT.1I6 Recognizing this situation, the legislature devel-
oped substantive standards by which informed consent is to be 
judgedll7 and procedural safeguards to guarantee these standards 
are met prior to clinical intervention.1I8 The substantive disclos-
ure aspects of California's ECT laws ensure the patient is pro-
vided with all information relevant to the treatment decision. 
The patient's decision is more likely to be knowing and intelli-
gent. The procedural mechanisms serve both medical and legal 
purposes. Required medical review tends to confirm that the pa-
tient arrived at a decision voluntarily, and not by coercive or 
unduly persuasive tactics. Such review also reduces exposure to 
the potentially harmful side effects of ECT by screening out pa-
tients for whom ECT is not a medical necessity. Judicial review 
of a patient's competency prior to the administration of treat-
ment against his or her wishes prevents the competent patient's 
will from being overborne. Through these means, the California 
ECT laws test the presence of the three "first principles" of in-
formed consent: knowledge, voluntariness, and competency.1I9 
The patient's right to refuse treatment is a corollary of the right 
to informed consent; the refusal is the self-actuating remedy of 
772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242-43, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10, 104 
Cal. Rptr. 505, 513-14 (1972). 
53. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269-70 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding the right to refuse 
treatment protected under the fourteenth amendment due process clause of the United 
States Constitution). 
54. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 
(1986) (citing right of privacy protected by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1). 
55. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242-43, 502 P.2d 1,9-10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513-
14 (1972). 
56. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal Rptr. 535 (1976). The appellate 
court stated: "The objective of the challenged law [an earlier, but similar, California 
statutory scheme regulating ECT) is to ensure certain medical procedures are not per-
formed on unwilling patients." [d. at 673, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 542. 
57. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.2 (West 1984). 
58. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5326.7; 5326.75 (West 1984). 
59. Kaimowitz v. Department of Ment. Health, 2 PRISON L. RPTR. 433 (Aug. 1973) 
(criminal sex offender seeking experimental psychosurgery to leave confinement in an 
institution). "To be legally adequate, a subject's informed consent must be competent, 
knowing, and voluntary." [d. at 476. 
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the decision not to consent. The right to informed consent is 
meaningless without the right to refuse treatment. so 
California ECT law is unusual in that it expressly lists what 
information the physician must disclose to obtain voluntary in-
formed consent.S1 The listed relevant factors include: (1) the ne-
cessity for treatment due to the nature and severity of the pa-
tient's disorder; (2) the nature of the recommended procedure, 
including the frequency and duration of the treatment; (3) the 
nature, degree, duration, and probability of medically known 
side effects and significant risks of the procedure (especially 
memory loss) and whether such adverse effects may be con-
trolled to any extent; (4) whether there is a division of expert 
opinion as to the efficacy of the treatment; (5) reasonable alter-
native treatments, and why the physician recommends this par-
ticular treatment; (6) that the patient has the right to accept or 
refuse the treatment; and (7) that the patient can revoke given 
consent at any time prior to or between treatments. 
Failure to adequately disclose any of the listed elements 
precludes a finding of informed consent and prohibits adminis-
tration of ECT to voluntary and involuntary patients.s2 A 
twenty-four hour grace period must lapse between the disclosure 
of the information and the procurement of the patient's written 
consent.S8 Coercive tactics used in order to obtain a patient's 
consent are forbidden.s• Intentional violations of the patient's 
rights to adequate disclosure and refusal of treatment subjects 
the physician to a penalty of no more than $5000 per violation.slI 
The attending physician must disclose all the information 
relevant to an informed consent determination to a responsible 
relative of the patient's choosing, and, if he or she has one, the 
patient's guardian or conservator. This requirement can be 
waived by the patient.ss 
60. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d ll27, ll37, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297,301 
(1986). 
61. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.2 (West 1984). 
62. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5326.7(d); 5326.75(a); 5326.85 (West 1984). 
63. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.5(e) (West 1984). 
64. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.5(a), (b) (West 1984). 
65. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.9(b) (West 1984). 
66. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7(c); see Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 
681, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 547 (1976) (invalidating a forced disclosure provision without the 
10
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The clear and intended effect of reauiring all this disclosure 
is to involve the patient in the decisionmaking process. No 
longer can he or she be ignorad. Those who oppose ECT regula-
tion complain that forced disclosure deters people from using 
ECT. They challenge these requirements as an unconstitutional 
interference with the practice of medicine. Perhaps their con-
cerns are misdirected. More likely it is the content of such dis-
closure, detailing the risks inherent in ECT, which turns people 
away from the treatment.87 
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act sets forth a number of 
procedural criteria that must be met before ECT can be admin-
istered.88 The procedures requiring review of the medical compo-
nents of the decision to treat with ECT ensure that the treat-
ment is not administered carelessly or without adequate medical 
justification.89 Such review is desirable for at least two reasons. 
First, ECT may have debilating side effects on patients, espe-
cially in memory and learning functions. Such risks should be 
avoided whenever possible. Second, ECT has been used as a re-
straint rather than as a treatment. This type of abuse can be 
curtailed by review for medical need. 
In order to preserve a detailed and permanent record of the 
medical treatment of the committed person, the attending phy-
sician must enter certain information relating to the recommen-
dation for ECT into the patient's chart. Adequate documenta-
tion must justify the use of ECT.70 All other reasonable 
treatment approaches (for example, psychotherapy) must have 
been carefully considered, but need not be exhausted.71 ECT 
must be definitely indicated and the least drastic treatment al-
ternative available.72 
ECT is considered excessive if administered more than fif-
waiver option as violative of the patient's rights to privacy and confidentiality). 
67. In another context (the regulation of securities), but with equal applicability, 
Justice Brandeis commented on the value of full disclosure. He wrote, "Sunlight is said 
to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." L.D. BRANDEIS. 
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 63 (1933). 
68. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5326.7; 5326.75 (West 1984). 
69. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7(a) (West 1984). 
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teen times in a thirty day period, or more than thirty times per 
year.78 When more than one cerebral seizure is induced in a sin-
gle session, each seizure shall be considered a separate treat-
ment.7" If the treating physician wishes to continue ECT admin-
istration beyond these limits, he or she must get approval from a 
review committee of the facility or county; any such approval 
must be for a fixed number of additional treatments.711 A patient 
may not consent more than thirty days in advance.76 
A facility which performs ECT must designate a qualified 
committee to review ECT treatments of voluntarily and involun-
tarily confined patients and verify the appropriateness and need 
for such treatments.77 For involuntary patients, the review com-
mittee is composed of two board-certified or board-eligible psy-
chiatrists or neurologists.78 At least one of the physicians must 
have personally examined the patient.79 The two physicians 
must unanimously agree (and so note in the patient's chart) with 
the recommendation of the treating physician before ECT can 
be administered.80 
The procedural mechanisms for administering ECT to vol-
untarily committed patients are identical to those for the invol-
untarily confined, except for the treatment review committee 
provisions. For voluntary patients, the review committee is made 
up of one (rather than two) board-certified or board-eligible psy-
chiatrist or neurologist.81 The scope of the inquiry is limited to 
verification of the patient's capacity to consent and that such 
consent has been given in writing.82 This verification must be 
noted in the patient's chart.8s Post-treatment review committees 
73. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 9 § 836(a) (1985). 
74. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 9 § 836(a) (1985). This definition is limited to reporting 
and recordkeeping purposes, but there is nothing to indicate that another standard 
would or should be used when considering the maximum number of treatments 
permissible. 
75. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 9 § 849(b) (1985). 
76. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7(d) (West 1984). 
77. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.91 (West 1984); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 9 § 847 
(1985). 
78. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7(b) (West 1984). 
79.Id. 
80.Id. 
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for both the voluntarily and the involuntarily confined are to be 
established by any facility performing ECT, or by the Depart-
ment of Mental Health.8• These bodies act as "watchdogs" by 
screening charts of performed ECT's for appropriateness and 
need. 
Use of the medical review committees helps to forestall co-
ercive and unseemly tactics which could undermine the volun-
tary nature of a patient's informed consent. In addition, medical 
review seeks to protect the patient's welfare by preventing his or 
her mental functions from being subjected to unnecessary ECT 
treatment.811 
Judicial review is more clearly aimed at verifying the mental 
patient's ability and legal competency to consent. Unlike that 
other well-publicized intrusive psychiatric treatment (psychosur-
gery),86 ECT may be forced upon an unwilling patient. The only 
mechanism for nonconsensual ECT is by obtaining a judicial de-
termination of the patient's incapacity to consent to a medical 
procedure, and then to solicit surrogate consent from an appro-
priate person.87 
In order to have a potential ECT patient declared incompe-
tent, definite procedures must be followed. A request for a judi-
cial determination of incompetency to consent can be initiated 
by either the treating physician or the patient's attorney by fil-
ing a petition in superior court. The court shall hold a compe-
tency hearing within three days after the petition is filed. The 
patient can retain counselor will be appointed legal representa-
tion if he or she cannot afford an attorney.88 If the patient's at-
torney is the one filing the petition for a declaration of incompe-
tency, he or she should be disqualified from representing the 
84. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.91 (West 1984); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 9 § 847 
(1985). 
85. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7(a), (b) (West 1984) (treating physician and 
review committee must make specific medical determination regarding the appropriate-
ness of ECT before the treatment can be administered). 
86. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6 (West 1984). The psychosurgery statute 
makes no distinction between voluntary and involuntary patients, and imposes greater 
restrictions on treatment. See also Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 683, 129 Cal. 
Rptr. 535, 548-49 (1976) (hazardous, experimental nature of psychosurgery justifies more 
extensive regulation than for ECT). 
87. CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE §§ 5326.7(e}-(h); 5326.75(c) (West 1984). 
88. [d. 
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patient at the hearing for conflict of interest reasons.89 
Incapacity to give informed consent will be found only if the 
person cannot understand, or knowingly and intelligently act 
upon, the information the physician is required to disclose.90 If a 
patient has previously been declared incompetent, then a guard-
ian (for unmarried minors) or a conservator (for adults and mar-
ried minors) must still follow this procedure.91 This provision 
recognizes the fact that a person may be incompetent to make 
certain decisions, yet retain sufficient mental acuity to make 
medical decisions. 
The California courts seem to grant judicial determinations 
of incompetency to consent to ECT reluctantly. The burden of 
proof is borne by the party seeking the declaration of incompe-
tency; the applicable standard of persuasion is clear and con-
vincing evidence.92 Even if the patient's motives in refusing 
treatment are a blend of psychotic and rational choices, incom-
petence will not be found.93 Only if a patient utterly lacks com-
prehension of what is being proposed will he or she be found 
incompetent.9• 
Once a patient has been determined legally incompetent, his 
or her rights to refuse treatment vanish. The treatment decision 
is turned over to a third party: either a responsible relative, 
guardian, or conservator.9~ The only limits on the discretion of 
this person appear to be the religious beliefs of the patient.96 
The purpose of the ECT provisions in the Lanterman-Pe-
89. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-102(b) (West 1981); See also 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983). These rules prohibit the attor-
ney from representing interests adverse to the client. If the attorney has filed the peti-
tion for a determination of incompetency, his or her representation of the client at the 
competency hearing would be in conflict with the earlier acts. The sole exception to these 
rules requires the client's consent to the conflict of interest. Since the petition asks for a 
determination of incompetency, it is difficult to see how the attorney could in good faith 
believe the client was capable of consenting to the conflict in representation. 
90. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.5(c) (West 1984). 
91. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(c) (West Supp. 1988). 
92. Lillian F. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 314, 206 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1984). 
93. Conservatorship of Waltz, 180 Cal. App. 3d 772, 227 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1986). 
94. In re Fadley, 159 Cal. App. 3d 330, 205 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1984). 
95. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5326.7(g); 5326.75(c) (West 1984). 
96. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5357 (West 1984); CAL PROB. CODE § 2355(b) (West 
1981). 
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tris-Short Act is to guarantee that voluntary, competent, and 
knowing consent is obtained from a patient prior to treatment. 97 
The regulations also protect the patient's welfare by limiting ad-
ministration of potentially dangerous ECT to cases for which 
the treatment is definitely indicated and the least drastic alter-
native available.98 The overall effect of the regulations has been 
to curtail the clinical use of ECT as treatment for persons with 
debilating mental disorders. The constitutional balance between 
purpose and effect is the subject of the next section. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS REGARDING 
CALIFORNIA'S REGULATORY SCHEME FOR ECT 
As we have seen, California extensively regulates the admin-
istration of ECT.99 This regulatory scheme has been subjected to 
constitutional challenge.loo The attack on the ECT laws centers 
on the review committee, forced disclosure, and substitute con-
sent provisions. Physicians and some patients believe that such 
regulation deprives them of a constitutional right to practice and 
to receive medical treatment. The state justifies its laws as pro-
tective of the welfare and autonomy of its citizens. Despite re-
cent constitutional interpretations regarding state regulation of 
medical care, many questions remain in this area. This section 
will pose these questions as they relate to California's ECT laws 
and attempt to answer them. Since both sides utilize privacy 
rights in their arguments, the current legal status of privacy 
shall be explored. 
PRIVACY RIGHTS 
Those seeking to have the ECT laws declared unconstitu-
tional rely heavily on the right of privacy in the patient-physi-
cian relationship. A natural starting point for this analysis would 
be to' determine to what extent privacy rights should be pro-
tected. If privacy rights are found to be fundamental, then legis-
97. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5326.5(a); 5326.7(d); 5326.75(a) (West 1984). 
98. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5326.7(a); 5326.75(a) (West 1984). 
99. See supra Section III, PRESENT CALIFORNIA ECT LA W. 
100. See supra notes 9-10; see also Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 668, 129 
Cal. Rptr. 535, 538-39 (1976) (Constitutional challenge to California's ECT laws brought 
by physicians). 
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lation (such as California's ECT laws) which infringes upon pri-
vacy rights must be examined with strict scrutiny. If privacy is 
not so regarded, then only a minimal scrutiny standard need be 
met. 
Rights explicit in the United States Constitution are univer-
sally regarded as fundamental. lol An examination of the text of 
the federal constitution will not reveal an express reference to a 
right of privacy. This absence should not be surprising since the 
phrase was not part of the terminology known to the framers. l02 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that a gen-
eral right of privacy is implicit in the constitution. loa The Court 
has been reluctant to define privacy rights broadly, such as by 
equating them with a concept of personal autonomy. Instead, 
the trend is to confine the right of privacy to narrow categories 
as defined by precedent. lo, The recent decision upholding Geor-
gia's criminal sodomy statute indicates a desire to confine pri-
vacy rights to decisions related to the traditional family. 1011 
Lower federal courts have regarded the right to refuse treatment 
as a substantive due process concept, rather than one involving 
privacy, with a corresponding reduction in the level of judicial 
scrutiny. loa California has an explicit right of privacy in its state 
constitution. l07 Case law is split, however, on whether these pri-
101. See Thornburgh v. American ColI. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (White, 
J., dissenting): "Fundamental liberties and interests are most clearly present when the 
Constitution provides specific textual recognition of their existence and importance." Id. 
at 790. 
102. It appears that the phrase "right to privacy" was coined by Brandeis and War-
ren in their famous law review article. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
103. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), drawing upon Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.s. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
104. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The Court defined privacy rights 
as "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and 
child rearing and education." Id. at 713. 
105. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that a Georgia statute 
criminalizing consensual sodomy did not implicate a fundamental right of privacy); see 
Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the 
Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361 (1979). "A family-based 
formulation of privacy disregards individual choice altogether; it champions societal in-
stitutions and therefore perpetuates the status quo." Id. at 365. 
106. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269, 271 (3d Cir. 1983) (less restrictive alterna-
tive analysis for a New Jersey statute curtailing the right to refuse antipsychotic medica-
tion is not required under the fourteenth amendment due process clause). 
107. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss2/8
1988] PATIENTS' PRIVACY RIGHTS 485 
vacy rights are implicated by medical decisionmaking.108 Failure 
to find some trigger of a fundamental right, whether under pri-
vacy or due process doctrine, means that California's ECT laws 
would be tested by a minimal scrutiny standard. 
PATIENT'S RIGHTS 
REVIEW COMMITTEES 
California ECT law requires both pre- and post-treatment 
review by medically qualified committees. Patients argue that 
such review interferes with the private decision making relation-
ship between themselves and their doctor. They f~rther com-
plain that the compulsory physical examination by members of 
the review committees is demeaning and intrusive of their pri-
vacy rights. 
In Doe v. Bolton,I°9 the United States Supreme Court held 
that the medical review committees established by the State of 
Georgia constituted a violation of a woman's privacy rights to 
make treatment decisions (an abortion) with the assistance of 
the attending physician. no Other abortion decisions have per-
108. This "split" exists mainly at the Supreme Court level. In People v. Privatera, 
23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979), a conviction of a physician and 
others for selling and prescribing laetrile in violation of the Health and Safety Code was 
held constitutional. The California Supreme Court said that the article I, section one 
right of privacy was not intended to apply to medical decisionmaking. The sponsors of 
the constitutional amendment were concerned solely with government surveillance and 
data collection activity. [d. at 709-10, 591 P.2d at 938-39, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 450-51. A 
somewhat contrary ruling is Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 
3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981), in which the article I, section one right 
of privacy was used to insulate a woman's decision to seek an abortion. [d. at 275, 625 
P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879. Supporting Myers use of the article I, section one 
right of privacy is Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. 
Rptr. 387 (1985), in which sterilization was held to be within the scope of these privacy 
rights. [d. at 160-65, 707 P.2d at 771-74, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 398-401. California Appellate 
Courts seem to line up in holding that privacy rights under the California Constitution 
do encompass medical decision making. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 
3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 
Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 
484 (1983). 
109. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
110. Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court: 
The woman's right to receive medical care in accordance with 
her licensed physician's best judgment and the physician's 
right to administer it are substantially limited by this statuto-
rily imposed overview .... We conclude that the interposition 
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mitted state-mandated involvement of additional medical per-
sonnel. III The determinative factor in distinguishing these 
seemingly anomalous results is whether the added medical at-
tention advanced some significant interest of the state.ll2 Pro-
ECT advocates, relying on Doe v. Bolton,118 argue that review in 
the context of psychiatric therapy constitutes unnecessary 
interference. 
Several distinctions between ECT and abortion must be 
noted. First, those committed to a state institution are treated 
by a number of staff personnel. They might not expect a private 
relationship with a single physician as a woman seeking an abor-
tion would. Second, persons committed for mental illness are 
more susceptible to persuasion and coercion. This is especially 
true of the involuntarily committed for whom release from the 
institution may depend on compliance with the attending physi-
cians.II' Third, pregnancy is a condition readily susceptible of 
objective proof; thus, there can be little doubt that abortion, 
when desired, is the appropriate remedy. Such certainty is not 
available, however, in psychiatric diagnoses. Reviewing the deci-
sion to treat with ECT to confirm the necessity of using ECT 
furthers the state's interest in protecting the health and welfare 
of its citizens-an interest not involved in the pre-viability abor-
tion situation. lUi Since state-mandated review of the decision to 
treat with ECT arguably furthers important state interests, the 
of the hospital abortion committee is unduly restrictive of the 
patient's rights and needs that, at this point, have already 
been medically deliniated and substantiated by her personal 
physician. 
[d. at 197-98. 
111. Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 482-86 (1983) (the partici-
pation by a second physician in an abortion procedure as required by Missouri law with 
the limited purpose of assisting in the event of a viable fetus being born alive upheld as 
furthering the state's compelling interest in preserving life). 
112. Compare the United States Supreme Court's statements in Doe v. Bolton, 410 
U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973), which indicated that review was unhelpful, to the ruling in Ash-
croft, 463 U.S. 476, 482-86 (1983), where the presence of a second physician assisted in 
the preservation of life. See also supra notes 110-111. 
113. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
114. See Kaimowitz v. Department of Ment. Health, 2 PRISON L. RPTR. 433 (Aug. 
1973). "The inherently coercive atmosphere to which the involuntarily detained mental 
patient is subject has bearing upon the voluntariness of his consent." [d. at 477. 
115. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7(a), (b) (West 1984) (Two member review 
committee must unanimously agree that ECT is definitely indicated and is the least 
drastic alternative available). 
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imposition on the patient-physician relationship might be 
tolerated. 
It is possible that voluntarily confined patients would be 
treated differently than the involuntarily confined. In Aden v. 
Younger,H8 the court held that the review committee's verifica-
tion of the medical appropriateness of the treatment decisions 
was violative of the voluntary (but not the involuntary) patient's 
privacy rights. The distinction between the two groups was 
based on the notion that voluntary patients are better able to 
protect their own interests. The difference between voluntary 
and involuntary patients is often more illusory than real; the 
classification may be arbitrary and bear no relation to the cir-
cumstances of their commitment.ll7 In addition, voluntarily con-
fined patients are equally vulnerable to threats and persua-
sion.H8 It may not be wise, therefore, to review voluntary and 
involuntary patients with different standards. 
Following the Aden ruling, the California legislature created 
new standards for voluntary patients.H9 A review committee of 
one physician is mandated, but only to verify the patient's com-
petency to consent-not whether the treatment decision was a 
good one. This alteration removes the constitutional defects of 
the Doe v. Bolton variety, since there is no state interference 
with the decision to treat. Given that medical review protects 
interests which apply with equal force to the voluntarily and in-
voluntarily confined,120 however, the decision in Aden to treat 
the two groups differently may not have been compelled by 
precedent.121 
116. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 684, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 550 (1976). 
117. See [d. at 674, 680, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43, 547. 
118. Note the anticoercion provisions of the LPS Act apply equally to voluntarily 
and involuntarily committed patients. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.5(a), (b) (West 
1984). 
119. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.75 (West 1984). 
120. As already noted, these interests include the prevention of coercion and the 
finding of medical appropriateness. See supra notes 64 and 98 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra note 112 and accompanying text, reconciling the competing results 
of Doe v. Bolton and Ashcroft. 
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DISCLOSURE OF THE ELEMENTS OF IN-
FORMED CONSENT 
As previously noted, California law requires the physician to 
convey specific risks and alternatives as part of the informed 
consent determination.122 The United States Supreme Court 
twice held that similar provisions in abortion statutes were an 
unconstitutional infringement on the patient-physician relation-
ship.123 The Court said that such information constituted a 
"parade of horribles" which was "designed not to inform the wo- . 
man's consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it 
altogether. "12( 
The abortion statutes can be partially distinguished from 
California's ECT laws on the basis that some of the condemned 
information in those laws was clearly unrelated to the patient's 
well-being. Other information noted in the abortion cases seems 
highly relevant to an informed risk-benefit determination. More-
over, there are some remarkable similarities between elements of 
the unconstitutional abortion statutes and California's ECT 
laws.126 Perhaps most importantly, it is virtually unquestioned 
that the ECT regulations were passed with the intent of cur-
tailing its use, the factor which damned the abortion laws. The 
greater risks associated with ECT may justify additional disclos-
ure since the patient needs more protection. 
SUBSTITUTE CONSENT 
Provisions for substitute consent can be found in California 
Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5326.7(e}-(h} and 
5326.75(c}. Voluntary and involuntary patients are treated in es-
sentially the same manner. 
122. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.2 (West 1984). 
123. Thornburgh v. American Coli. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
124. Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-45. 
125. For example, in Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747, the Court invalidated provisions 
requiring the physician to inform the woman of "detrimental physical and psychological 
effects" and the "particular medical risks" of abortion. [d. at 759-65. In Akron, 462 U.S. 
416, a provision characterizing abortion as "a major surgical procedure" and listing po-
tential physical and psychological complications was held unconstitutional. [d. at 442-45. 
Compare with the information which must be given to prospective ECT patients. See 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5326.2 (West 1984) 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss2/8
1988] PATIENTS' PRIVACY RIGHTS 489 
In Youngberg v. Romeo,u6 the United States Supreme 
Court established that a minimally adequate level of treatment 
is guaranteed to committed patients by the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause.127 The California Supreme Court relied 
on the fourteenth amendment liberty interest and the express 
California constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection 
in holding that an incompetent woman had the right to a sterili-
zation procedure.126 The thrust of these two decisions is that a 
committed individual has a right to treatment, and incompe-
tence cannot be a barrier to the exercise of personal rights. 
Taken together, the rulings seem to mandate substitute consent 
provisions in legislation regulating the administration of "mini-
mally adequate" medical treatment to those committed in state 
institutions. 
If it is accepted that incompetents have some right to treat-
ment, then the question becomes who gets to decide, and under 
what conditions treatment will be provided. There are at least 
three competing models: professional judgment, substituted 
judgment, and the California approach. 
The professional judgment standard was articulated in 
Youngberg v. Romeo. 129 Under this standard, the only constraint 
upon substitute decisionmaking is that the treatment plan can-
not deviate from accepted professional practice. ISO Furthermore, 
if the decision is made by a professional, (including a physician, 
nurse, or those "subject to the supervision" of either) then it is 
presumptively valid. lSI Physicians prefer this standard since it 
gives them the most latitude and authority in the decisionmak-
126. 457 u.s. 307, 319 (1982). 
127. Justice Blackmun noted in concurrence: 
[d. at 326. 
If a state court orders a mentally retarded person committed 
for "care and treatment", however, I believe that due process 
might well bind the state to ensure that the conditions of his 
commitment bear some reasonable relation to each of these 
goals. In such a case, commitment without any "treatment" 
whatsoever would not bear a reasonable relation to the pur-
poses of the person's confinement. 
128. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 160-65, 707 P.2d 760, 771-74,219 
Cal. Rptr. 387, 398-401 (1985). 
129. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322. 
130. [d. at 323. 
131. [d. at 323. 
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mg process. 
The substituted judgment standard focuses on the needs 
and desires of the patient rather than the physician. The ap-
proach of this standard is to ask what decisions this individual 
would have made were he or she competent.132 A number of fac-
tors have been indentified as essential to such a determination: 
the expressed preferences of the patient, the patient's religious 
convictions, the impact on the patient's family, the probability 
and severity of adverse side effects, the patient's prognosis with 
and without the proposed treatment, and any other relevant fac-
tors. Most significantly, the substituted judgment model re-
quires a court to be the one making these decisions for the in-
competent patient by balancing these factors.133 
California charts a course all its own. As firmly enunciated 
in the right to die cases,134 an individual has the right to refuse 
treatment, even if such proposed treatment is in accordance 
with accepted professional judgment. Courts do not consider any 
of the medical implications of the proposed treatment; the focus 
is on the patient's legal competency. m If a patient has been 
declared incompetent under the legislated standard, the decision 
132. Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't. of Ment. Health, 390 Mass. 489, 459 N.E.2d 
308,318-19 (1983) (class action alleging constitutional violations in forced druggings); see 
also Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40, 56-59 (1977) (forced adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs for an incompetent); Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 373 
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427-32 (1977) (terminally ill incompetent seeking discontinu-
ation of cancer treatment). 
133. Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 318-19. 
134. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); 
Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Barber v. 
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 95 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). The Bouvia court 
stated: 
By refusing petitioner relief which she sought [removal of a 
forced feeding tube), the trial court, with the most noble in-
tentions, attempted to exercise its discretion by issuing a rul-
ing which would uphold what it considered a lawful object, i.e., 
keeping Elizabeth Bouvia alive by a means which it considered 
ethical. Nonetheless, it erred for it had no discretion to exer-
cise. Petitioner sought to enforce only a right which was exclu-
sively hers and over which neither the medical profession nor 
the judiciary have any veto power. The trial court could but 
recognize and protect her exercise of that right. 
[d. at 1135, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299. 
135. Reise v. St. Mary's Hospital and Medical Center, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1407-
08, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241, 253 (1987), cert. granted. 
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to administer treatment is not made by the courts. Instead, the 
conservator, responsible relative, or guardian has the power to 
accede to the treatment proposal.18S 
Health care providers attacking the ECT laws would rather 
not have to obtain a judicial determination of incompetency. 
Emphasis is put on the delay in providing the patient with treat-
ment. Little regard is given to the patient's desires. Instead, the 
focus is on administering medicine as the attending physician 
chooses.187 
Of the three substitute consent approaches, the professional 
judgment standard advocated by the federal courts is the most 
permissive.18s Unlike the federal standard, the substituted judg-
ment and the California approaches require a judicial determi-
nation of incapacity to consent before the patient's will can be 
overborne.18B While California courts are unwilling to second 
guess the physician with respect to purely medical conclu-
sions,140 they concur with courts following the substituted judg-
ment standard that incompetence is a legal, not a medical, de-
termination.14l Such legal rulings must, of course, be made by 
legal bodies. 
RIGHTS OF THE PHYSICIANS 
Licensed ECT practitioners argue that the California laws 
regulating administration of the treatment are an unconstitu-
tional deprivation of their right to practice their trade. Their 
theory is that, once licensed, a physician may practice medicine 
according to his or her best professional judgment. State regula-
tion of medical practitioners has long been upheld as a legiti-
136. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5326.7(g); 5326.75(c) (West 1984). 
137. See supra note 6. 
138. See Reise, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1405-06, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241, 252 (1987), cert. 
granted (discussing the extreme deference of the courts to the physician's decision under 
the federal standard). 
139. See supra notes 132-33 and 87-96, respectively and accompanying text. 
140. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
141. Reise, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1406, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 252 (1987), cert. granted; 
Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y. 2d 485, 496-97, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 80, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (1986) 
(involuntarily confined patients challenged forcible administration of antipsychotic 
medications); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't. of Ment. Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 
N.E.2d 308, 312-15 (1983). 
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mate exercise of its police powers.142 Unless the legislation re-
stricting the physician is "patently arbitrary and totally lacking 
in rational justification," any constitutional challenges will 
fail. 143 The rational basis of California's ECT laws cannot be se-
riously questioned-to protect the welfare of its citizens is cer-
tainly rational. Any other claims by the physicians will generally 
be regarded as derivative of those of the patients.144 
JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE STATE FOR ITS ECT 
LAWS 
The state justifies its regulation of ECT on at least two 
grounds: to protect the welfare of the mentally ill and to protect 
the competent individual's right to refuse treatment. The poten-
tially dangerous side effects of ECT are a valid reason for state 
intervention in the administration of psychiatric treatment. Uti 
Failure to adequately oversee the ECT process could result in 
unnecessary treatments and injuries to patient's mental 
functions. 
The protection of the patient's right to refuse treatment is 
also a valid state interest. The scope of the patient's right to 
refuse has been the subject of much litigation in state and fed-
eral courts.146 The federal rights said to be implicated in the 
142. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1953) (physician's suspension from 
practice of medicine for a prior conviction was upheld). "It is equally clear that a state's 
legitimate concern for maintaining high standards of professional conduct extends be-
yond initial licensing. Without continuing supervision, initial examinations afford little 
protection." [d. at 451. 
143. Association of Amer. Phys. & Sur. v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 131-32 
(N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd. 423 U.S. 975 (1975) (challenge to federal professional standards 
review law). 
144. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 (1977). 
145. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 680-81, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 546-47 
(1976). 
146. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (determination under the federal 
constitution of rights of the involuntarily detained to refuse forcible administration of 
antipsychotic drugs avoided for a determination of such rights under state law); Rennie 
v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988) 
(action by an involuntary patient relying on Minnesota's constitutional right to privacy 
attacking forcible administration of neuroleptic drugs in non-emergency situations); In re 
Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987) (involuntarily committed pa-
tient asserting right to refuse antipsychotic medication); Rogers v. Commissioner of 
Dep't. of Ment. Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983); Guardianship of Roe, 383 
Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1977); Reise v. St. Mary's Hospital and Medical Center, 196 
" 
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right to refuse include the first amendment, 147 fourteenth 
amendment,l4S and right to privacy.H9 After the decision by the 
United States Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo, the fed-
eral courts have given far less weight to the individual's con-
cerns. Rather, the inquiry is whether the physicians seeking to 
override the patient's wishes have exercised their best profes-
sional judgment. If they have done so, the individual has no 
right to refuse any proposed treatment plan. 1&0 
A state may protect the right to refuse more vigorously than 
does the federal constitution. III I Apart from the LPS Act itself, it 
is possible that the explicit California constitutional right of pri-
vacy provides such additional protection. If so, the state's inter-
est in protecting the patient's right to refuse is increased, since 
the right itself would be considered more important. As previ-
ously noted, however, current case law is divided as to the appli-
cability of this privacy right to medical treatment decisions.162 
v. CONCLUSIONS 
If any right can be said to be in a state of flux, it is the right 
of privacy. Ever since its first enunciation, courts have been un-
certain of its perimeters and strength. Except in the emotionally 
charged area of abortion, state legislation has largely survived 
attacks based on privacy grounds. By giving legally competent 
patients the power to control their own destiny in treatment de-
cisions, the California legislature was responding to a perceived 
imbalance in bargaining strength between mental patients and 
their physicians. In this sense, the California ECT laws are remi-
niscent of the labor laws declared unconstitutional by the 
Cal. App. 3d 1388,243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1987), cert. granted; Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. 
App. 3d 526, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1986) (involuntary administration of antipsychotic 
drugs to prisoners); Kaimowitz v. Department of Ment. Health, 2 PRISON L. RPTR. 433 
(Aug. 1973). 
147. See, e.g., Kaimowitz, 2 PRISON L. RPTR. at 477-78, quoting from Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969): "Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of 
giving government the power to control men's minds .... " Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. 
148. See, e.g., Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269-70. 
149. See, e.g., Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 317. 
150. See Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269-70. 
151. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 289 (1982). "[lIt is distinctly possible that Massachu-
setts recognizes liberty interests of persons adjudged incompetent that are broader than 
those protected directly by the Constitution of the United States." [d. at 303. 
152. See supra note 108. 
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United States Supreme Court in the Lochner era. lIiS California's 
ECT laws protect the patient's welfare as well as their right to 
refuse unwanted treatment. Any attendant imposition on the 
freedom to make medical decisions is justified by these compel-
ling interests. To invalidate ECT laws on nebulous privacy or 
liberty grounds and pave the way for an untoward increase in 
the use of this potentially devastating treatment would not only 
deprive the mentally ill of a fairly won political victory, but 
would also exalt the form of individual rights over its substance. 
David Whitcomb* 
153. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Of course, another parallel can be 
drawn in that those seeking to invalidate the legislation rely upon unenumerated consti-
tutional rights. 
*Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
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